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Abstract: We study in depth the class of games with opacity condition, which
are two-player games with imperfect information in which one of the players only
has imperfect information, and where the winning condition relies on the infor-
mation he has along the play. Those games are relevant for security aspects
of computing systems: a play is opaque whenever the player who has imperfect
information never “knows” for sure that the current position is one of the distin-
guished “secret” positions. We study the problems of deciding the existence of
a winning strategy for each player, and we call them the opacity-violate problem
and the opacity-guarantee problem. Focusing on the player with perfect infor-
mation is new in the field of games with imperfect-information because when
considering classical winning conditions it amounts to solving the underlying
perfect-information game. We establish the EXPTIME-completeness of both
above-mentioned problems, showing that our winning condition brings a gap of
complexity for the player with perfect information, and we exhibit the relevant
opacity-verify problem, which noticeably generalizes approaches considered in
the literature for opacity analysis in discrete-event systems. In the case of blind-
fold games, this problem relates to the two initial ones, yielding the determinacy
of blindfold games with opacity condition and their PSPACE-completeness.
Key-words: Games, Imperfect Information, Opacity, Security
Proble`mes d’opacite´ dans les jeux a` information
imparfaite
Re´sume´ : Nous e´tudions en de´tail la classe des jeux a` condition d’opacite´,
qui sont des jeux a` deux joueurs a` information imparfaite dans lesquels seul
l’un des joueurs n’a pas information parfaite, et ou` la condition de gain de´pend
de l’information que celui-ci a au cours du jeu. Ces jeux sont lie´s a` des as-
pects de se´curite´ des syste`mes informatiques : une partie est opaque si le
joueur a` information imparfaite ne “sait” jamais avec certitude que la posi-
tion courante est l’une des positions spe´ciales dites “secre`tes”. Nous e´tudions
les proble`mes de de´cision d’existence de strate´gie gagnante pour chaque joueur,
et nous les appellons opacity-violate problem et opacity-guarantee problem. Le
fait de s’inte´resser au joueur a` information parfaite est nouveau en the´orie des
jeux a` information imparfaite car lorsqu’on conside`re des conditions de gain clas-
siques cela revient a` conside´rer le jeu a` information parfaite sous-jacent. Nous
e´tablissons que les deux proble`mes sus-mentionne´s sont EXPTIME-complets,
montrant ainsi que notre condition de gain apporte un saut de complexite´ pour
le joueur a` information parfaite, et nous exhibons le proble`me opacity-verify qui,
de manie`re inte´re´ssante, ge´ne´ralise des approches conside´re´es dans la litte´rature
pour l’analyse d’opacite´ des syste`mes a` e´ve`nements discrets. Dans le cas des
jeux en aveugle, ce proble`me se relie aux deux proble`mes initiaux, de telle sorte
que les jeux en aveugle a` condition d’opacite´ sont de´termine´s et que les trois
proble`mes sont PSPACE-complets.
Mots-cle´s : Jeux, Information imparfaite, Opacite´, Se´curite´
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1 Introduction
We described in [13] a class of two-player games with imperfect information that
we called games with opacity condition. In these games, the players are Robert
(for “robber”) and Gerald (for “guardian”). Robert has imperfect information
as opposed to Gerald who has perfect information. This asymmetric setting is
very relevant for the verification of open systems and all the more for security
aspects as it captures the intuitive picture of an attacker having only a partial
information against a system. The game model we consider relies on the classical
imperfect-information arenas, as defined in e.g. [15, 1], but it is equipped with a
subset of positions that denote confidential information and that we call secrets.
We focus on the opportunity for Robert to discover some secret, by introducing
the property of opacity: a play is opaque if, at each step of the (infinite) play,
the set of positions that are considered possible by Robert does not consist
of secrets only. In games with opacity condition, the opacity property is the
winning condition for Gerald. Informally, Robert tries to force the game to
reach some point when he knows for sure that the current position is a secret,
whereas Gerald tries to keep Robert under uncertainty. Note that this winning
condition can be seen as a particular epistemic temporal logic statement [9]
on an imperfect information arena seen as an epistemic temporal model : this
ETL formula is G¬KRobertsecret. However, to our knowledge the complexity
of deciding the existence of winning strategies for such winning conditions has
never been studied in depth.
Our claim that games with opacity condition are natural and adequate mod-
els for practical applications is all the more sustained by very recent contribu-
tions of the literature [16, 8]. These results mainly arise from the analysis of
discrete-event systems and their theory of control, and our games embed some
problems studied in this domain, such as the verification of opacity. Our ab-
stract setting provided by the game-theoretical paradigm enables us to focus on
essential aspects of the topic, such as synthesizing strategies, and to circumvent
the complexity of the problems.
Not surprisingly, games with opacity condition are not determined [13]. We
therefore introduced two dual problems: the opacity-violate problem and the
opacity-guarantee problem, that consist of deciding the existence of a winning
strategy, respectively for Robert and for Gerald. The opacity-violate problem
generalizes the strategy problem in reachability games with imperfect informa-
tion [15], and so does the opacity-guarantee problem, but putting the emphasize
on the player who has perfect information and has the complementary safety
objective. The latter is, to our knowledge, never been done, for the follow-
ing reason. In two-player games with imperfect information, when considering
the existence of winning strategies for a player, one can equivalently consider
that the opponent has perfect information (see [15]). Thus, when dealing with
omega-regular winning conditions in arenas where the imperfect information is
asymmetric, focusing on the player with perfect information would amount to
solve the underlying perfect-information game. Our case is different : when
considering Gerald’s point of view, we could indeed equivalently consider that
Robert plays with perfect information too, but we cannot give up the imperfect-
information setting because the definition of the winning condition itself relies
on Robert’s information along the play.
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Additionally to the two aforementioned problems, we consider the opacity-
verify problem as an intermediate problem: the question here is to decide
whether in a game with opacity condition, all strategies of Gerald are win-
ning. The choice of considering this apparently weird problem is well motivated.
Firstly, it is equivalent both to the opacity-guarantee problem and to the com-
plementary of the opacity-violate problem for blindfold games; an immediate
consequence is the determinacy of blindfold games with opacity conditon. And
secondly, it enables us to embed opacity issues in discrete-event systems with a
strong language-theoretic feature, addressed earlier in the literature [16, 8].
In this contribution, we consider the three problems of opacity-violate, opacity-
guarantee and opacity-verify, keeping in mind that our main attention turns
to the opacity-guarantee problem. It is not hard to establish the EXPTIME-
completeness of the opacity-violate problem, from a power-set construction in-
spired by [15] that amounts to solving a reachabilty perfect-information game,
and from the fact that it generalizes imperfect-information games with reacha-
bility condition, known to be EXPTIME-complete [15]. Regarding the opacity-
guarantee problem, we rely on an earlier power-set construction to reduce this
problem to a perfect-information game [13], yielding EXPTIME membership.
The EXPTIME-hardness result for this problem, where the main player (Ger-
ald) has perfect information, was unknown until now and relies on a reduction
from the empty input string acceptance problem for linearly-bounded alternat-
ing Turing machines. As a corollary, the model checking problem for AETL [6]
is EXPTIME-hard, hence EXPTIME-complete in the size of the arena. The key
point is a pioneer encoding of configurations by information sets. Concerning
the opacity-verify problem, we prove its PSPACE-completeness, which for the
lower bound relies on a reduction similar to the one in [5] from the universal-
ity problem for nondeterministic automata [10]. Interestingly, the opacity-verify
problem relates the two other problems for the particular case of blindfold games,
in such a way that those games are determined. We also show that the blind-
fold setting embraces the language-theoretic approches for opacity analysis in
discrete-event systems [16, 8].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define games with opacity
condition. In Section 3, we present the opacity-guarantee problem and the
opacity-violate problem, and we establish their EXPTIME complexity. We first
recall the power-set constructions from [13] yielding the upper bounds, then we
show the matching lower bounds. In Section 4, we consider the opacity-verify
problem for blindfold games. In this setting, we establish the determinacy and
the PSPACE completeness of the three opacity problems. In Section 5, we retale
the opacity-verify problem to the language opacity verification of [16, 8]. In
Section 7, we discuss complexity aspects of problems regarding Gerald’s winning
strategies. We conclude in Section 8 by giving some ideas on our current and
future work.
2 Games with opacity condition
A game with opacity condition over the alphabet Σ and the set of observations Γ
is an imperfect information game structure A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S) where V is
a finite set of positions, ∆ : V ×Σ→ 2V \∅ is a transition function, obs : V → Γ
is an observation function, and act : Γ → 2Σ\∅ assigns to each observation a
INRIA
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non-empty set of available actions, so that available actions are identical for
observationally equivalent positions. Finally, v0 is the initial position, and the
additional element S ⊆ V in the structure A is a finite set of secret positions.
In a game A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S), the players are Gerald and Robert. A
play is an infinite sequence of rounds, and in each round i ≥ 1, Robert chooses
an action ai ∈ act(obs(vi−1)), Gerald chooses the new position vi ∈ ∆(vi−1, ai),
and Robert observes obs(vi). A play in A is an infinite sequence ρ = v0a1v1 . . . ∈
v0(ΣV )
ω that results from an interaction of Robert and Gerald in this game.
We now extend obs to plays by letting obs(v0a1v1a2v2 . . .) := v0a1γ1a2γ2 . . .
with γi = obs(vi) for each i ≥ 1. The imperfect information setting leads Robert
to partially observe a play ρ as obs(ρ). Note that since the initial position is a
part of the description of the arena, it is known by Robert.
For every natural number k ∈ N and play ρ, we denote by ρk ∈ v0(ΣV )k
the k-th prefix of ρ, defined by ρk := v0a1v1 . . . akvk, with the convention that
ρ0 = v0. We denote by ρ
+ an arbitrary prefix of ρ.
Since the information revealed to Robert is based on observations, a strategy
of Robert in A is a mapping of the form α : v0(ΣΓ)
∗ → Σ such that for any play
prefix ρk ending in observation γ, α(obs(ρk)) ∈ act(γ). On the contrary Gerald
has perfect information on how the play progresses, so a strategy of Gerald in
A is a mapping of the form β : v0(ΣV )
∗Σ→ V such that for any play prefix ρk
ending in position v, for all a in act(obs(v)), β(ρka) ∈ ∆(v, a).
Given strategies α and β of Robert and of Gerald respectively, we say that
a play ρ = v0a1v1 . . . is induced by α if ∀k ≥ 1, ak = α(obs(ρk−1)), and ρ is
induced by β if ∀k ≥ 1, vk = β(ρk−1ak). We also note α̂ β the only play induced
by α and by β.
In the following, an observation γ might be interpreted as the set of positions
it denotes, namely obs−1(γ).
Let us fix a play ρ = v0a1v1a2v2 . . .. Note that every k-th prefix of ρ charac-
terizes a unique information set I(ρk) ⊆ V consisting of the set of positions that
Robert considers possible in the game after k rounds. Formally, information sets
can be defined inductively as follows.
Definition 1 For every play ρ = v0a1v1a2v2 . . ., we let I(ρ
0) := {v0} and
I(ρk+1) := ∆(I(ρk), ak+1) ∩ obs(vk+1), for k ∈ N.
We now define the opacity property:
Definition 2 For a given set of secret positions S ⊆ V , a play ρ satisfies the
opacity property for S, or is S-opaque, if:
∀k ∈ N, I(ρk) * S
Informally, the opacity condition means that Robert never knows with cer-
tainty that the current position is a secret, because there is always one of the
positions he considers possible that is not a secret. In a game with opacity con-
dition, the opacity property is the winning condition for Gerald, i.e S-opaque
plays are winning for Gerald, and the other ones are winning for Robert.
Remark 1 The definition of the arena and of the opacity condition are slightly
different from the ones in [13] : originally Robert’s aim was to reach a single-
ton information set. We introduce here the set of secret positions and define
the winning condition accordingly because it makes these games closer to the
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intuition behind opacity. Anyway the results established in [13] still hold in this
setting, and adapting the proofs is straightforward.
3 Opacity-violate and opacity-guarantee prob-
lems
It is well known that perfect-information games are determined [12], and that
imperfect-information games are not determined in general. We recall that a
game is determined if each position is winning for one of the two players.
We proved the following result in [13]:
Theorem 1 Games with opacity condition are not determined in general.
This result leads to introduce two dual problems. We remind that α (resp.
β) stands for a strategy of Robert (resp. Gerald). We first consider Robert’s
point of view.
Definition 3 Given a game with opacity condition A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S),
the opacity-violate problem is to decide whether the following property holds:
∃α, ∀β, α̂ β is not S-opaque
We now consider Gerald’s dual point of view.
Definition 4 Given a game with opacity condition A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S),
the opacity-guarantee problem is to decide whether the following property holds:
∃β, ∀α, α̂ β is S-opaque
Remark 2 It is important to comment on Definition 4 regarding the universal
quantification over Robert’s strategies. As defined, this quantification ranges
over observation based strategies only. The opacity-guarantee problem would
however be equivalent if this quantification ranged over the wider set of perfect
information strategies, as already argumented by Reif in [15] : along a play,
Robert’s possible behaviors are not restricted by observation-based strategies.
In the rest of this section we prove the following result:
Theorem 2 The opacity-violate and opacity-guarantee problems are EXPTIME-
complete.
In the following, we adopt the classic convention that the size of a game is
the size of its arena, i.e. the number of positions.
3.1 Power-set constructions for upper bounds
We recall the power-set constructions of [13] that lead to equivalently solve
perfect information games.
We first address the opacity-violate problem. Since we consider the point of
view of the player with imperfect information, this problem is close to problems
usually studied in games with imperfect information. This is why we can easily
INRIA
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rely on previous work on the topic to study its complexity. We remind the
construction from [13], which is strongly inspired from the one described by
Reif in [15] :
Let A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S) be a game with opacity condition. We define
a reachability perfect-information game A˜, where the players are Roberta and
SuperGeraldine1. A position of A˜ is either I where I is a reachable information
set in A - it is a position of Roberta -, or (I, a) where I is a reachable information
set in A and a ∈ act(I) 2 - it is a position of SuperGeraldine.
The game is played as follows. It starts in the initial position I0 := {v0}
of Roberta. In a position I, Roberta chooses a ∈ act(I) and moves to position
(I, a). Next, let O be the set of reachable observations from I by a. SuperG-
eraldine chooses a next information set ∆(I, a) ∩ γ, where γ ranges over O. In
A˜, a play I0(I0, a1)I1(I1, a2) . . . is winning for Roberta if it reaches a position
of the form I with I ⊆ S, otherwise it is winning for SuperGeraldine.
Theorem 3 [13] Robert has a winning strategy in A, if and only if, Roberta
has a winning strategy in the perfect-information game A˜.
Due to nondeterminacy (Theorem 1), the opacity-guarantee problem has to
be studied on its own. We remind the power-set construction for the opacity-
guarantee problem described in [13], that leads to a safety perfect-information
game Â. In this game, unlike in A˜, we maintain an extra information on how
Gerald is playing in A. The players in Â are SuperRoberta3 and Geraldine. A
position in Â is either of the form (I, v) where I is a reachable information set
in A, and v ∈ I - it is a position of SuperRoberta -, or of the form (I, v, a) where
I is a reachable information set in A, v ∈ I, and a ∈ act(I) - it is a position
of Geraldine. The initial position is ({v0}, v0). In position (I, v), SuperRoberta
chooses a ∈ act(I), and moves to (I, v, a). In position (I, v, a), Geraldine chooses
v′ ∈ ∆(v, a) and moves to (I ′, v′) where I ′ = ∆(I, a) ∩ obs(v′). In Â, a play
(I0, v0)(I0, v0, a1)(I1, v1) . . . is winning for SuperRoberta if it reaches a position
(I, v) with I ⊆ S, otherwise it is winning for Geraldine.
Theorem 4 [13] Gerald has a winning strategy in A, if and only if, Geraldine
has a winning strategy in the perfect-information game Â.
It is well known that perfect-information reachability games and perfect-
information safety games are solvable in PTIME. Since the constructions of A˜
and Â involve a single exponential blow-up, it follows from Theorems 3 and 4
that the opacity-violate and opacity-guarantee problems are in EXPTIME.
3.2 Matching lower bounds
We prove here that the opacity-violate and the opacity-guarantee problems are
EXPTIME-hard.
1We use the superlative “Super” here because in general the winning strategies of SuperG-
eraldine do not reflect any winning strategy of Gerald in A. She has “more power” than
Gerald.
2act(I) makes sense because an information set is always a subset of a single observation.
3we use the superlative “Super” as, contrary to what Roberta could do in the game A˜,
SuperRoberta can take advantage of the extra information.
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First, EXPTIME-hardness of the opacity-violate problem is proved by a
reduction from reachability imperfect-information games of [15]. Recall that a
reachability imperfect-information game is a game of imperfect information A =
(V, F,∆, obs, act, v0) over Σ and Γ with a distinguished set of target observations
F ⊆ Γ that Robert aims at reaching.
Theorem 5 [15] Solving reachability imperfect-information games is EXPTIME-
complete.
The reduction is straightforward. Let A = (V, F,∆, obs, act, v0) be a reach-
ability imperfect-information game over Σ and Γ. We define the game with
opacity condition A′ := (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S) over Σ and Γ, where S =
⋃
γ∈F γ.
It is easy to see that solving the reachability imperfect-information game A is
equivalent to solving the opacity-violate problem in the game A′ : a winning
strategy for Robert to reach F in A is also a winning strategy for Robert in
A′, and vice versa (remember that the information set is always a subset of the
current observation).
We now show that the opacity-guarantee problem is EXPTIME-hard by
a polynomial-time reduction from the acceptance problem of the empty input
string for linearly-bounded alternating Turing Machines (TM) with a binary
branching degree, which is EXPTIME-complete [4]. The key idea is to encode
TM configurations by the information sets.
In the rest of this section, we fix such a TM machine M = (B,Q = Q∀ ∪
Q∃ ∪ {qacc, qrej}, q0, δ), where B is the input alphabet, Q∃ (resp. Q∀) is the set
of existential (resp. universal) states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, qacc /∈ Q∀ ∪Q∃
is the (terminal) accepting state, qrej /∈ Q∀ ∪ Q∃ is the (terminal) rejecting
state, and δ : (Q∀ ∪ Q∃) × B → (Q × B × {+1,−1}) × (Q × B × {+1,−1})
is the transition function. In each non-terminal step (i.e., the current state
is in Q∀ ∪ Q∃), M overwrites the tape cell being scanned, and the tape head
moves one position to the left (−1) or right (+1). Let n be the size of M and
[n] = {1, . . . , n}. We assume that n > 1.
Since M is linearly bounded, we can assume that M uses exactly n tape
cells when started on the empty input string ε. Hence, a configuration (of
M over ε) is a word C = w1 (q, b)w2 ∈ B∗ · (Q × B) · B∗ of length exactly
n denoting that the tape content is w1 b w2, the current state is q, and the
tape head is at position |w1| + 1. The initial configuration Cinit is given by
(q0, )
n−1, where is the blank symbol. Moreover, without loss of generality,
we assume that when started on Cinit, no matter what are the universal and
existential choices, M always halts by reaching a terminal configuration C, i.e.
such that the associated state, written q(C), is in {qacc, qrej} (this assumption is
standard, see [4]). For a non-terminal configuration C = w1 (q, b)w2 (i.e. such
that q ∈ Q∃ ∪ Q∀), we denote by succL(C) (resp. succR(C)) the successor of
C obtained by choosing the left (resp. the right) triple in δ(q, b). An accepting
computation tree of M over ε is a finite tree T whose nodes are labeled by
configurations and such that the root is labeled by Cinit, the leaves are labeled
by accepting configurations C, i.e. q(C) = qacc, each internal node x is labeled
by a non-terminal configuration C, and: (1) if C is existential (i.e., q(C) ∈ Q∃),
then x has exactly one child whose label is one of the two successors of C, and (2)
if C is universal (i.e., q(C) ∈ Q∀), then x has exactly two children corresponding
to the two successors succL(C) and succR(C) of C. We construct a game with
INRIA
Opacity Issues in Games with Imperfect Information 9
opacity condition AM such that Gerald has a winning strategy in AM if, and
only if, there is an accepting computation tree ofM over ε (Theorem 6). Hence,
EXPTIME-hardness of the opacity-guarantee problem follows.
In the game AM, the tape content can be retrieved from the current in-
formation set (of size n), and the remaining information about the current
configuration is available in each position of the information set. A step of the
machine is simulated by two rounds of the game: in the first round, depending
on whether the current state is universal or existential, Robert simulates the
universal choice of the next configuration or Gerald simulates the existential
choice, and the second round simulates the updating of the configuration of the
machine.
Here, we describe the construction of the game AM = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S).
1. V = {v0, safeL, safeR, safechoice}∪
(
([n]×B)×([n]×Q×B)×{L,R, choice}).
2. obs : V → Γ = {γ0, γchoice, γL, γR} is defined by
obs(v) =

γ0 if v = v0
γL if v ∈ {safeL} ∪
(
([n]×B)× ([n]×Q×B)× {L})
γR if v ∈ {safeR} ∪
(
([n]×B)× ([n]×Q×B)× {R})
γchoice otherwise.
3. act : Γ→ Σ = {∀L, ∀R, ∃} ∪B is defined by
act(γ) =

Σ if γ = γ0
{∀L, ∀R, ∃} if γ = γchoice
B otherwise.
4. S = ([n]×B)× ([n]× {qrej} ×B)× {choice}.
We delay the formal definition of ∆ : V ×Σ→ 2V \∅ after informally describing
the running of the game.
A configuration C is encoded by an information set If (C) of the form
{((1, b1), (i, q(C), bi), f), . . . , ((n, bn), (i, q(C), bi), f)}
where f ∈ {L,R, choice}, i is the position of the tape cell of C being scanned,
and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, bj is the content of the j-th cell. For each f ∈
{L,R, choice}, If (C) is called the f -code of C, and during a play, the current
information set is of the form If (C) for some reachable configuration C of the
machine, unless Robert happened to have made some deviating move which
does not simulate the dynamics of M. We capture this deviation by making
Robert lose: technically, the play enters one of the safe positions safeL, safeR,
or safechoice that do not belong to the set S of secrets; then, once a safe
position is reached, only other safe positions can be reached, yielding Gerald
to win, whatever Robert does in the future. Note that for each f ∈ {L,R},
If (C) does not violate the opacity condition for S, and Ichoice(C) violates the
opacity condition for S if, and only if, C is rejecting (i.e. q(C) = qrej). For all
q ∈ Q∃ ∪ Q∀ and b ∈ B, we denote by δL(q, b) (resp. δR(q, b)) the left (resp.
right) triple in δ(q, b). The behavior of AM is as follows:
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First round: From the initial position v0, whatever Robert and Gerald choose,
the information set at the end of the first round is Ichoice(Cinit), the
choice-code of the initial configuration.
The current information set is Ichoice(C) for some terminal configuration C:
If C is rejecting, then Ichoice(C) ⊆ S and Gerald loses. Otherwise,
Ichoice(C) 6⊆ S and independently of the move of Robert, the play reaches
a safe position safedir for some dir ∈ {L,R} and Gerald wins.
As we shall see, there remain only two cases, which in turn simulate a complete
step of M.
The current information set is Ichoice(C) for some non-terminal configuration
C:
Let v = ((k, bk), (i, q(C), bi), choice) be the current position (correspond-
ing to some position in Ichoice(C)). From obs(v), Robert can only choose
actions in {∃, ∀L, ∀R}. There are again two cases.
C is existential (note that this information is contained in the position
v). Moves ∀L and ∀R of Robert are deviating and the play reaches
one of the safe positions safeL or safeR, thus Gerald wins. If instead
Robert’s move is ∃, the following move dir ∈ {L,R} of Gerald aims
at simulating the existential choice ofM in the configuration configu-
ration C. The reached position is then v′ = ((k, bk), (i, q(C), bi), dir).
C is universal. The move ∃ of Robert is deviating and the following
move of Gerald can lead only to safeL or safeR, which makes him
win. Instead Robert’s move ∀dir ∈ {∀L, ∀R} simulates the universal
choice of M in the configuration C. Next, Gerald’s move is unique
and leads to the position v′ = ((k, bk), (i, q(C), bi), dir).
Whatever the type of the configuration C was, by letting the observation
classes split positions with different values of dir (see the definition of
obs above), the information set after the move of Gerald becomes Idir(C),
unless Robert’s move was deviating.
The current information set is Idir(C) with dir ∈ {L,R}, for some non-
terminal configuration C:
Let the current position be v = ((k, bk), (i, q(C), bi), dir) ∈ Idir(C), and
let
δdir(q(C), bi) = (qdir, bdir, θdir). The value j = i + θdir represents the
position of the cell being scanned in the next configuration succdir(C);
note that the value j is easily computable from the current position v.
In order however to complete the step of the machine and to reach the
information set Ichoice(succdir(C)), the value of bj must be provided by
the game. Therefore, we let bj be the only non-deviating move of Robert
from position v ∈ Idir(C), among the possible moves in B.
From position v = ((k, bk), (i, q(C), bi), dir), the above behavior is imple-
mented as follows. Let b be the action chosen by Robert. If k /∈ {i, j},
tape cell k is unchanged by the step of the machine, hence the only pos-
sible move of Gerald leads to ((k, bk), (j, qdir , b), choice). If k = i, tape
cell i is overwritten, hence the move of Gerald is unique and leads to
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((i, bdir), (j, qdir , b), choice). Finally, if k = j, there are two cases. If b = bj,
then Gerald can only move to ((j, bj), (j, qdir , bj), choice) which updates
the data for the next configuration succdir(C), otherwise the move b (6= bj)
of Robert is deviating (and the play reaches a safe position).
We can now formally define the moves in AM, by letting ∆ : V ×Σ→ 2V \∅
be:
Case v = v0:
∆(v, a) = {((h, ), (1, q0, ), choice) | h ∈ [n]}
Case v = safechoice:
∆(v, a) = {safedir | dir ∈ {L,R}}
Case v = safedir, where dir ∈ {L,R}:
∆(v, a) = {safechoice}
Case v = ((h, b), (i, q, b′), choice):
∆(v, a) =

{((h, b), (i, q, b′), dir) | dir ∈ {L,R}} if a = ∃ and q ∈ Q∃
{((h, b), (i, q, b′), L)} if a = ∀L and q ∈ Q∀
{((h, b), (i, q, b′), R)} if a = ∀R and q ∈ Q∀
{safedir | dir ∈ {L,R}} otherwise
Case v = ((h, b), (i, q, b′), dir), where dir ∈ {L,R}, q /∈ {qrej , qacc}, and
δdir(q, b
′) = (qdir, bdir, θdir):
∆(v, a) =

{((h, b), (i+ θdir, qdir, a), choice)} if a ∈ B and h /∈ {i, i+ θdir}
{((h, bdir), (i+ θdir, qdir, a), choice)} if a ∈ B and h = i
{((h, b), (i+ θdir, qdir, b), choice)} if a = b and h = i+ θdir
{safechoice} otherwise
Case v = ((h, b), (i, q, b′), dir), where dir ∈ {L,R} and q ∈ {qrej , qacc}:
∆(v, a) = {((h, b), (i, q, b′), choice)}
This achieves the construction of the game AM which satisfies the following:
Theorem 6 There is an accepting computation tree of M over ε if, and only
if, there is a winning strategy of Gerald in the game AM.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 6.
First, we need additional definitions. For each v ∈ V , we denote by AvM the
game (V,∆, obs, act, v, S), i.e. the game defined exactly as AM with the unique
difference that the initial position is v. A play of AM starting from v is a play
of AvM. Similarly, a strategy of Gerald from position v, is a strategy of Gerald
in the game AvM. Given a play ρ = v
′
0a1v
′
1 . . . from v
′
0 = v and a set I0 ⊆ V
such that v ∈ I0, for each k ≥ 0, the information set I(ρk, I0) of the prefix
ρk of ρ w.r.t. I0 is inductively defined as I(ρ
k) with the unique difference that
initially we set I(ρ0, I0) = I0. In particular, if I0 = {v}, then I(ρk, I0) = I(ρk)
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for each k ≥ 0. Let β be a strategy of Gerald from position v. An outcome of
β is a play ρ = v′0a1v
′
1 . . . starting from position v such that for each k > 0,
v′k = β(ρ
k−1ak). Given I0 ⊆ V such that v ∈ I0, we say that β is winning for
Gerald w.r.t. I0 if, and only if, for each outcome ρ of β and k ≥ 0, I(ρk, I0) 6⊆ S.
Note that for I0 = {v}, the above notion corresponds to the notion of winning
strategy of Gerald in the game AvM.
The full computation tree of M (over ε) Tfull is the tree whose nodes are
labeled by configurations such that: (1) the root is labeled by Cinit, (2) each
leaf node is labeled by a terminal configuration, and (3) each internal node x
is labeled by a non-terminal configuration C and has two children labeled by
succL(C) and succR(C), respectively. By our assumptions, Tfull is finite. For a
configuration C, we say that C is reachable if there is some node in Tfull which
is labeled by C. Note that for all nodes x and x′ of Tfull, if x and x′ are labeled
by the same configuration, then the subtrees rooted at x and x′ are isomorphic.
Thus, if C is a reachable configuration, we denote by height(C) the height of
any subtree of Tfull rooted at a node labeled by C. Furthermore, if C is a
reachable configuration, we say that C leads to acceptance if, and only if, the
following is inductively satisfied: or (1) C is accepting, or (2) C is an existential
configuration and succdir(C) leads to acceptance for some dir ∈ {L,R}, or
(3) C is an universal configuration and succdir(C) leads to acceptance for each
dir ∈ {L,R}. Evidently, there is an accepting computation tree of M over ε if,
and only if, Cinit leads to acceptance. Now, we prove some preliminary results.
Claim 1: Let v ∈ V and vsafe be a safe position in {safeL, safeR, safechoice}
such that obs(v) = obs(vsafe) (note that v and vsafe can coincide). Then, for
each I0 ⊆ V such that v, vsafe ∈ I0 and play ρ starting from v, the following
holds: for each k ≥ 0, I(ρk, I0) 6⊆ S.
Proof of Claim 1: Let ρ = v′0a1v
′
1 . . . with v
′
0 = v. Since each safe position
in {safeL, safeR, safechoice} is not in the secret S, it suffices to show that for
each k ≥ 0, I(ρk, I0) contains a safe position vk,safe and obs(vk,safe) = obs(v′k).
This is proved by induction on k ≥ 0. The base case (k = 0) is obvious. Now,
assume that I(ρk, I0) contains some safe position vk,safe such that obs(vk,safe) =
obs(v′k). There are three cases:
• obs(vk,safe) = safeL: hence, obs(vk,safe) = obs(v
′
k) = γL. By defini-
tion of the transition function, obs(v′k+1) = γchoice, and ∆(safeL, ak+1) =
{safechoice}. Since obs(v′k+1) = obs(safechoice) and safechoice ∈ ∆(I(ρk, I0), ak+1),
the result follows.
• obs(vk,safe) = safeR: this case is similar to the previous one.
• obs(vk,safe) = safechoice: hence, obs(vk,safe) = obs(v
′
k) = γchoice. By def-
inition of the transition function, obs(v′k+1) = γdir for some dir ∈ {L,R}.
Moreover, ∆(safechoice, ak+1) = {safeL, safeR}. Since obs(v′k+1) =
obs(safedir) and safedir ∈ ∆(I(ρk, I0), ak+1), the result follows.
Claim 2: Let C be a reachable configuration which leads to acceptance. Then,
for each v ∈ Ichoice(C), there is a winning strategy of Gerald from position v
w.r.t. Ichoice(C).
Proof of Claim 2: The proof is by induction on height(C).
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Base case: height(C) = 0, hence C is a terminal configuration. Since C leads
to acceptance, C is accepting. Let v ∈ Ichoice(C). We show that each play from v
satisfies the opacity condition for S, hence the result follows. Let ρ = v′0a1v
′
1 . . .
be a play from v. By definition of the transition function, v′1 ∈ {safeR, safeL}.
By Claim 1, it follows that for each k > 0, I(ρk) 6⊆ S. Since v′0 = v /∈ S, the
result follows.
Induction step: height(C) > 0, hence C is a non-terminal configuration.
There are two cases:
• C is universal: since C leads to acceptance, succdir(C) leads to acceptance
for each dir ∈ {L,R}. Since height(succdir(C)) < height(C) for each
dir ∈ {L,R}, by the induction hypothesis, it follows that for each v ∈
Ichoice(succdir(C)), there is a winning strategy β
v
dir of Gerald from position
v w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)). Let v ∈ Ichoice(C). We define a strategy
βv : v(ΣV )∗Σ → V of Gerald from position v as follows. For all k ≥ 0,
a ∈ Σ, and w ∈ (ΣV )k, βv(vwa) is defined as follows:
– k ≤ 1: let v′ be the last position in w and v′′ be an arbitrary position
in ∆(v′, a). We set βv(vwa) = v′′.
– k > 1: hence, vwa can be written in the form va1v1a2v2w
′a. If
v2 ∈ Ichoice(succdir(C)) for some dir ∈ {L,R}, we set βv(vwa) =
βv2dir(v2w
′a). Otherwise, let v′ be the last position in w and v′′ be an
arbitrary position in ∆(v′, a). We set βv(vwa) = v′′.
Now, we show that βv is a winning strategy for Gerald from position v
w.r.t. Ichoice(C). Let ρ = v
′
0a1v
′
1 . . . be an outcome of β
v (hence, v′0 = v).
We need to show that ρ is winning for Gerald w.r.t. Ichoice(C), i.e. for
each k ≥ 0, I(ρk, Ichoice(C)) 6⊆ S. By definition of the transition function,
either v′1 ∈ {safeL, safeR} or there is dir ∈ {L,R} such that v′1 is the
position in Idir(C) associated with v. In the first case, since Ichoice(C) 6⊆
S, by Claim 1, we deduce that I(ρk, Ichoice(C)) 6⊆ S for each k ≥ 0. Thus,
in this case, the result holds. Now, assume that v′1 is the position in Idir(C)
associated with v. By definition of the transition function, a1 = ∀dir, and
we easily deduce that I(ρ1, Ichoice(C)) = Idir(C). Moreover, ∆(v
′
1, a2) is
a singleton and there are two cases: either I(ρ2, Ichoice(C)) contains the
safe position safechoice or I(ρ
2, Ichoice(C)) = Ichoice(succdir(C)). In the
first case, since I(ρk, Ichoice(C)) 6⊆ S for each k = 0, 1, the result directly
follows from Claim 1. In the second case, v′2 ∈ Ichoice(succdir(C)), and by
definition of βv, the suffix v′2a2v
′
3 . . . of ρ is an outcome of strategy β
v′2
dir.
Since this suffix is winning for Gerald w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)), the result
follows.
• C is existential: since C leads to acceptance, there is dir ∈ {L,R}
such that succdir(C) leads to acceptance. Since height(succdir(C)) <
height(C), by the induction hypothesis, we have that for each v ∈ Ichoice(succdir(C)),
there is a winning strategy βvdir of Gerald from position v w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)).
Let v ∈ Ichoice(C). We define a strategy βv : v(ΣV )∗Σ → V of Gerald
from position v as follows. For all k ≥ 0, a ∈ Σ, and w ∈ (ΣV )k, βv(vwa)
is defined as follows:
– k = 0: since C is existential, by definition of the transition function if
a = ∃, then ∆(v, a) = {vL, vR}, where vL (resp. vR) is the position in
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IL(C) (resp. IR(C)) associated with v. In this case, we set β
v(va) =
vdir. If instead a 6= ∃, then ∆(v, a) = {safeL, safeR}, and we set
βv(va) to an arbitrary position in {safeL, safeR}.
– k = 1: let w = a1v1 and v2 be an arbitrary position in ∆(v1, a). We
set βv(vwa) = v2.
– k > 1: hence, vwa can be written in the form va1v1a2v2w
′a. If
v2 ∈ Ichoice(succdir(C)), we set βv(vwa) = βv2dir(v2w′a). Otherwise,
let v′ be the last position in w and v′′ be an arbitrary position in
∆(v′, a). We set βv(vwa) = v′′.
Now, we show that βv is a winning strategy for Gerald from position
v w.r.t. Ichoice(C). Let ρ = v
′
0a1v
′
1 . . . be an outcome of β
v (hence,
v′0 = v). We need to show that ρ is winning for Gerald w.r.t. Ichoice(C).
By definitions of the transition function and strategy βv, either v′1 ∈
{safeL, safeR} or v′1 is the position in Idir(C) associated with v. In the
first case, since Ichoice(C) 6⊆ S, by Claim 1, we deduce that I(ρk, Ichoice(C)) 6⊆
S for each k ≥ 0. Thus, in this case, the result holds. Now, assume that
v′1 is the position in Idir(C) associated with v. By definition of the tran-
sition function, a1 = ∃, and we easily deduce that I(ρ1, Ichoice(C)) =
Idir(C). Moreover, ∆(v
′
1, a2) is a singleton and there are two cases: either
I(ρ2, Ichoice(C)) contains the safe position safechoice or I(ρ
2, Ichoice(C)) =
Ichoice(succdir(C)). In the first case, since I(ρ
k, Ichoice(C)) 6⊆ S for each
k = 0, 1, the result directly follows from Claim 1. In the second case,
v′2 ∈ Ichoice(succdir(C)), and by definition of βv, the suffix v′2a2v′3 . . . of
ρ is an outcome of strategy β
v′2
dir. Since this suffix is winning for Gerald
w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)), the result follows.
Claim 3: Let C be a reachable configuration and v ∈ Ichoice(C). If there is
a winning strategy of Gerald from position v w.r.t. Ichoice(C), then C leads to
acceptance.
Proof of Claim 3: Let β be a winning strategy of Gerald from position v
w.r.t. Ichoice(C). We show by induction on height(C) that C leads to accep-
tance.
Base case: height(C) = 0, hence C is a terminal configuration. By hypothesis
Ichoice(C) 6⊆ S. By definition of S, we deduce that C is accepting, and the
result follows.
Induction step: height(C) > 0, hence C is a non-terminal configuration.
Then, there is i ∈ [n] such that v is associated with the i-th cell of C. For
each dir ∈ {L,R}, we denote by vdir (resp. vsuccdir ) the position in Idir(C)
(resp. Ichoice(succdir(C))) associated with the i-th cell of C (resp. succdir(C)).
Moreover, let bdir be the content of the cell being scanned in succdir(C). We
distinguish two cases:
• C is universal: we show that for each dir ∈ {L,R}, there is a winning strat-
egy βdir of Gerald from position v
succ
dir w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)). Hence,
by the induction hypothesis, the result follows. By definition of the tran-
sition function, for each dir ∈ {L,R}, there is an outcome ρdir of β hav-
ing the form ρdir = v ∀dir vdir bdir vsuccdir . . . such that I(ρ2dir, Ichoice(C)) =
Ichoice(succdir(C)). Then, for each w ∈ (ΣV )∗ and a ∈ Σ, we set βdir(vsuccdir w a) =
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β(v ∀dir vdir bdir vsuccdir w a). Evidently, βdir is a winning strategy of Gerald
from position vsuccdir w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)), and the result holds.
• C is existential: we show that there exists dir ∈ {L,R} such that there is a
winning strategy βdir of Gerald from position v
succ
dir w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)).
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, the result follows. By definition of
the transition function, there exists dir ∈ {L,R} and an outcome ρdir of β
having the form ρdir = v ∃ vdir bdir vsuccdir . . . such that I(ρ2dir, Ichoice(C)) =
Ichoice(succdir(C)). Then, for eachw ∈ (ΣV )∗ and a ∈ Σ, we set βdir(vsuccdir w a) =
β(v ∃ vdir bdir vsuccdir w a). Evidently, βdir is a winning strategy of Gerald
from position vsuccdir w.r.t. Ichoice(succdir(C)), and the result holds.
Now, we prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6: First, assume that there is an accepting computation
tree of M over ε. Hence, Cinit leads to acceptance. By Claim 2, for each
position v ∈ Ichoice(Cinit), there is a winning strategy βv of Gerald from position
v w.r.t. Ichoice(Cinit). Moreover, by the definition of the transition function,
each play (from the initial position) has the form ρ = v0a0v . . . such that v ∈
Ichoice(Cinit) and I(ρ
1) = Ichoice(Cinit). Let β be the strategy of Gerald defined
as follows:
• for each a ∈ Σ, β(v0a) is an arbitrary position in ∆(v0, a);
• for each a1v1w ∈ (ΣV )∗ and a ∈ Σ, if v1 /∈ Ichoice(Cinit), then β(v0a1v1wa)
is some arbitrary position in ∆(v′, a), where v′ is the last position in a1v1w;
otherwise, we set β(v0a1v1wa) = β
v1 (v1wa).
Evidently, β is a winning strategy of Gerald.
Now, assume that there is a winning strategy β of Gerald. Let v be an arbi-
trary position in Ichoice(Cinit) and let β
v be the strategy of Gerald from position
v defined as follows: for each a ∈ Σ and w ∈ (ΣV )∗, βv(vwa) = β(v0a0vwa).
Since β is winning for Gerald, by definition of the transition function, it follows
that βv is a winning strategy of Gerald from position v w.r.t. Ichoice(Cinit). By
Claim 3, it follows that Cinit leads to acceptance. Hence, there is an accepting
computation tree of M over ε, which concludes.
4 Blindfold games with opacity condition
We recall that a game with imperfect information is blindfold if all positions
have the same observation.
Lemma 7 Let A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0) be a blindfold game with imperfect in-
formation over Σ and Γ = {γ}. For every play prefix ρn = v0a1v1 . . . anvn,
I(ρn) = ∆({v0}, a1 . . . an).
The proof is trivial, by applying the definition of the information set.
In blindfold games Robert cannot base the choice of his actions on anything
because he sees nothing of what Gerald does. So a strategy for Robert is just
an infinite sequence of actions. More formally:
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Lemma 8 Let A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0) be a blindfold game with imperfect infor-
mation over Σ and Γ = {γ}, let α be a strategy for Robert, then there exists
a1a2a3 . . . ∈ Σω such that for all strategies β and β′ for Gerald, obs(α̂ β) =
obs(α̂ β′) = v0a1γa2γ . . .
In the rest of this section we prove the following two theorems:
Theorem 9 Blindfold games with opacity condition are determined.
Theorem 10 For blindfold games with opacity condition, the opacity-guarantee
problem and the opacity-violate problem are PSPACE-complete.
Both theorems are proved by considering a third problem: the opacity-verify
problem which addresses the strong ability for Gerald to win the game. We
define this problem and establish its PSPACE-completeness in the general set-
ting of games with opacity condition and also in the particular case of blindfold
games (Theorem 11). We finally compare it to the opacity-violate and opacity-
guarantee problems for blindfold games (Theorem 14).
Definition 5 Given a game with opacity condition A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S),
the opacity-verify problem is to decide whether the following property holds:
∀β, ∀α, α̂ β is S-opaque (1)
If Property (1) holds, any strategy β of Gerald is a winning-strategy. Otherwise,
there exists a play in the game that is not S-opaque.
Theorem 11 The opacity-verify problem is PSPACE-complete, even for blind-
fold games.
For the PSPACE membership, we design an algorithm that decides whether
there exists a losing play for Gerald, which is clearly equivalent to deciding
whether there exists a strategy of Gerald that is not winning. The algorithm
runs in NPSPACE, hence in PSPACE [17], by nondeterministically choosing
the moves for Robert and Gerald, and by updating the current information
set of Robert at each round. Since information sets are subsets of the set of
positions, if there are n positions, we need O(n) space to run this algorithm.
The PSPACE-hardness of the opacity-verify problem results from a reduction
from the universality problem for a complete nondeterministic finite automa-
ton (NFA), known to be PSPACE-complete [18]. This reduction was initially
inspired by [7] but is in fact a variant of the one in [5].
We recall that a NFA A = (Q,Σ,∆, Q0, Qf ) is a nondeterministic finite
automaton with states Q, alphabet Σ, transition relation ∆ : Q × Σ → 2Q
and sets of (respectively) initial and accepting states Q0 and Qf . A NFA A is
complete if for every state q and letter a, ∆(q, a) 6= ∅. The language L(A) ⊆ Σ∗
of A is the set of words w ∈ Σ∗ such that ∆(Q0, w) ∩Qf 6= ∅. The universality
problem is to decide whether A accepts all possible finite words, i.e L(A) = Σ∗.
Given a complete NFA A = (Q,Σ,∆, Q0, Qf ), define the blindfold game
with opacity condition AA = (Q ∪ {q0},∆′, obs, act, q0, S) over Σ and Γ = {γ},
with q0 /∈ Q, as follows:
S = Q\(Qf ∪ {q0})
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act(γ) = Σ
∀q ∈ Q ∪ {q0}, obs(q) = γ
∀a ∈ Σ,∆′(q, a) =
{
Q0 if q = q0
∆(q, a) otherwise
Since, firstly, q0 is not reachable after the first move, secondly, ∆
′(q, a) =
∆(q, a) for q 6= q0 and finally, ∆′(q0, a) = Q0 for all a, we obtain from lemma 7
the following corollary :
Corollary 12 For each play prefix in AA of the form ρn = q0a1q1 . . . anqn with
n ≥ 1, I(ρn) = ∆(Q0, a2 . . . an)
One may note that the aim of the initial position q0 is to initialise Robert’s
information set to Q0 at the end of the first round.
Proposition 13 The NFA A is universal if, and only if, in AA, every strategy
of Gerald is winning.
Proof We start with the right-left implication. Assume that every strategy is
winning for Gerald. Take one strategy β, and take a word w ∈ Σ∗. Consider a
play ρ in wich Robert’s first moves form the sequence of actions aw, for some a
in Σ, and Gerald follows strategy β. This is possible because the underlying au-
tomaton is complete. Being ρ induced by the winning strategy β, it is S-opaque,
hence in particular I(ρ1+|w|) * S. By Corollary 12 we obtain : ∆(Q0, w) * S,
which implies that there exists a position q in ∆(Q0, w) that is in Qf , hence A
accepts w. A is universal.
For the other implication, suppose that A is universal. Let β be a strategy
of Gerald, and let ρ be a play induced by β. We prove that ρ is S-opaque.
Let n ∈ N. If n = 0, I(ρn) = {q0} * S. If n > 0, there exists w in Σ∗ such
that I(ρn) = ∆(Q0, w) (Corollary 12). Since A is universal it accepts w, hence
∆(Q0, w) ∩Qf 6= ∅. So I(ρn) * S, and this finishes the proof.
Theorem 14 In a blindfold game with opacity condition, the opacity-verify
problem, the opacity-guarantee problem and the complementary of the opacity-
violate problem are equivalent.
Proof Let A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S) be a blindfold game with opacity condi-
tion. It is clear that in general,
∀β, ∀α, α̂ β is S-opaque⇒ ∃β, ∀α, α̂ β is S-opaque
We prove the converse in the case of blindfold games. Suppose that there exists
a winning strategy β for Gerald. We prove that any strategy β′ is also winning.
Let α be a strategy for Robert. Since A is blindfold, by Lemma 8 we have
that obs(α̂ β) = obs(α̂ β′), so for every n ∈ N, I(α̂ β′ n) = I(α̂ βn) * S.
So we have that the opacity-verify problem is equivalent to the opacity-
guarantee problem in blindfold games. We now show that the opacity-verify
problem is also equivalent to the complementary of the opacity-violate problem
(decide whether ∀α, ∃β s.t. α̂ β is S-opaque holds).
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Once again one implication is trivial :
∀β, ∀α, α̂ β is S-opaque⇒ ∀α, ∃β, α̂ β is S-opaque
Now the other way. Suppose that for any strategy α there is a strategy β for
Gerald such that α loses. Now take any couple of strategies (α, β′). We know
that there exists a strategy β such that α̂ β is S-opaque. But we also know
(Lemma 8) that obs(α̂ β) = obs(α̂ β′) because the game is blindfold, so once
again for every n ∈ N, I(α̂ β′n) = I(α̂ βn) * S.
The idea behind this theorem is that in blindfold games with opacity condi-
tion, the outcome of a play does not rely on Gerald’s behaviour but only on what
Robert plays. Indeed, since he observes nothing of what Gerald does, Robert’s
information set, and so the winning condition, are only determined by the series
of actions he chooses. Thus, these games via a power-set construction can be
seen as (reachability) one-player games: each position is a reachable informa-
tion set I, at each step the unique player (Robert) chooses an action a ∈ act(I),
where I is the current position, and moves to position ∆(I, a). Therefore, in
blindfold games with opacity condition, whether Robert has a winning strategy
(i.e a winning sequence of actions), or Gerald wins whatever he does.
The determinacy of blindfold games with opacity condition (Theorem 9) is
an immediate corollary of the above Theorem 14. Also Theorem 10 results from
Theorems 14 and 11.
5 Related work
Opacity has mostly been studied in the framework of discrete-event systems
and their theory of control ([16, 8]). It is both interesting and important to
know to what extent the classical problems in this field can be embedded into
our games. We first describe the discrete-event system setting, next we define
the notion of opacity in this framework. We finally propose a translation from
the verification of opacity in this setting to the opacity-verify problem in games
with opacity condition.
First we recall that a a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) is a NFA A =
(Q,Σ, δ, q0, Qf) but with a unique initial state q0 and in which the transition
relation δ : Q×Σ→ 2Q satisfies |δ(q, a)| ≤ 1 for all states q and input symbols
a.
The problem of opacity is defined in [8] with regards to a LTS G (labelled
transition system, i.e a DFA without accepting states) and a confidential pred-
icate φ over execution traces of G, representable by a regular language Lφ ⊆ Σ∗
where Σ is the set of events of the transition system. For convenience, we equiv-
alently state it on a DFA AφG representing the transition system together with
the secret predicate. The automaton AφG is simply the synchronized product of
G with some complete DFA accepting Lφ. We denote by T (A) ⊆ Σ∗ the set of
execution traces of an automaton A, and by L(A) the language accepted by A,
so we have that T (AφG) = T (G) and L(AφG) = T (G) ∩ Lφ. From now on, for a
DFA A, a state q and w ∈ T (A), δ(q, w) shall denote the only state it contains.
We consider a subset of events Σa ⊆ Σ which denotes the observation capa-
bilities of a potential attacker of the system, and we let PΣa be the projection
function from Σ∗ to Σ∗a. Two words w and w
′ are observationally equivalent if
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PΣa(w) = PΣa(w
′). We denote by [w]a = P−1Σa (PΣa (w)) the set of words in Σ
∗
that are observationally equivalent to the word w with regard to Σa.
Definition 6 Lφ is opaque w.r.t. T (G) and Σa if
∀w ∈ T (G), [w]a ∩ T (G) * Lφ
This means that Lφ is opaque w.r.t. T (G) and Σa if, and only if, whenever
an execution trace of G verifies the confidential predicate φ there exists another
possible execution trace observationally equivalent that does not verify φ.
We take an instance of the opacity verification problem,AφG = (Q,Σ, δ, qG0 , Qf ),
and we describe the construction of the game with opacity condition AφG such
that the following holds.
Theorem 15 Verifying that Lφ is opaque w.r.t T (G) and Σa is equivalent to
deciding the opacity-verify problem in AφG.
The construction starts from AφG where transitions labelled by events in
Σ\Σa are turned into -transitions. Then we remove those -transitions as de-
scribed in [10] by taking the -closure of the transition function, and we obtain
the -free nondeterministic finite automaton A = (Q,Σa,∆, Q0, Qf).
In this automaton, transitions are all labelled by observable events. One
should think of the nondeterminism in this automaton as the uncertainty the
attacker has concerning the behaviour of the system. More precisely, she does
not know when an observable event is triggered whether the system takes “in-
visible” transitions or not, may it be before, after, or both before and after the
observable one.
We need the following lemma, which is a mere consequence of the construc-
tion :
Lemma 16
∀w ∈ Σ∗a,∆(Q0, w) = {δ(qG0 , w′) | w′ ∈ [w]a ∩ T (G)}
We can now define the game AφG = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S) over Σ
′ = {√} and
Γ = {γx | x ∈ Σa} ∪ {γ}:
• V = Q× Σa ∪Q0 × {} ∪ {vinit}.
• ∆(v,
√
) =
{
{(q′, y) | y ∈ Σa, q′ ∈ ∆(q, y)} if v = (q, x)
{(q, ) | q ∈ Q0} if v = vinit
• ∀(q, x) ∈ V, obs((q, x)) = γx, and obs(vinit) = γ
• ∀v ∈ V, act(v) = {√}
• S = {(qf , x) | qf ∈ Qf , x ∈ Σa ∪ {}} and v0 = vinit
Remark 3 Without loss of generality we can assume that in every state q of A
there exists an event y in Σa such that ∆
(q, y) is not empty. So in every position
(q, x) in V , ∆((q, x),
√
) is not empty, and the game can always continue.
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In this game, Robert is passive. He only observes Gerald, who simulates the
system G. If the game is in position (q, x), it represents that we are in state q
in the system G, and that the last visible event was x (if x = , no observable
event happened yet). Robert observes γx, i.e the only information he gains
during a play is the sequence of visible events.When Gerald plays, he chooses
a visible event y and a state reachable from q through y in A, which can be
seen as choosing as many invisible transitions in G as he wishes, plus one visible
amongst them, y. We shall note α√ the only possible strategy for Robert, which
is to always play
√
.
vinit is the initial position, that can never be reached after the first move.
It is used to initialize Robert’s information set to Q0 × {} (these are the only
reachable positions from vinit, and they have the same observation, γ). This
represents the set of states in G that are reachable before any observable tran-
sition is taken.
We start the proof of Theorem 15 by establishing this central lemma.
Lemma 17 Let ρn+1 = vinit
√
(q0, )
√
(q1, x1) . . .
√
(qn, xn) be a prefix of a play,
with n ≥ 0. Then {q | (q, xn) ∈ I(ρn+1)} = ∆(Q0, x1 . . . xn) and for all (q, x)
in I(ρn+1), x = xn.
Proof The latter fact is obvious, from the definition of observations.
Considering the former fact, we prove it by induction on n.
n = 1 : I(ρ1) = ∆({vinit},√) ∩ γ = {(q0, ) | q0 ∈ Q0}, so we clearly have :
{q | (q, ) ∈ I(ρ1)} = Q0 = ∆(Q0, )
n+ 1 :
{q | (q, xn+1) ∈ I(ρn+2)} = {q | (q, xn+1) ∈ ∆(I(ρn+1),√) ∩ obs((qn+1, xn+1))}
= {q | (q, xn+1) ∈ ∆(I(ρn+1),√)}
= {q | ∃(q′, xn) ∈ I(ρn+1), q ∈ ∆(q′, xn+1)}
= {q | ∃q′ ∈ ∆(Q0, x1 . . . xn), q ∈ ∆(q′, xn+1)}
= ∆(Q0, x1 . . . xn+1)
We move on to the proof of Theorem 15. Suppose that every strategy β is
winning for Gerald. We prove that Lφ is opaque w.r.t T (G) and Σa. Take a word
w in T (G). There exists a prefix of a play ρn+1 = vinit√(q0, )√(q1, x1) . . .√(qn, xn)
such that x1 . . . xn = PΣa(w). So there exists a strategy β such that α
√ β̂n+1 =
ρn+1. With lemma 17 and 16 we have that {q | (q, xn) ∈ I(ρn+1)} = {δ(qG0 , w) | w ∈
[x1 . . . xn]a ∩ T (G)}. Since β is winning, {q | (q, xn) ∈ I(ρn+1)} * Qf , so there
exists w′ in [x1 . . . xn]a ∩ T (G) = [w]a ∩ T (G) such that δ(qG0 , w′) /∈ Qf . This
implies that [w]a ∩ T (G) * Lφ.
Now suppose that Lφ is opaque w.r.t T (G) and take β a strategy for Gerald
in AφG, we prove that β is winning. Let ρβ = α
√ β̂ be the only possible play
induced by β. Take a prefix ρn+1β = vinit
√
(q0, )
√
(q1, x1) . . .
√
(qn, xn) of this
play. By Lemma 17 and 16 again, {q | (q, xn) ∈ I(ρn+1β )} = {δ(qG0 , w) | w ∈
[x1 . . . xn]a ∩ T (G)}. Since an information set is never empty, there exists w in
[x1 . . . xn]a ∩T (G), and because Lφ is opaque w.r.t T (G), [x1 . . . xn]a ∩T (G) *
Lφ. So there exists w′ in [x1 . . . xn]a∩T (G) such that δ(qG0 , w′) = q /∈ Qf , hence
(q, xn) /∈ S and I(ρnβ) * S. β is winning.
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6 Strategies for Gerald
In this section we consider some aspects of strategies for Gerald. We first recall
the notion of memory of a strategy.
Definition 7 Let A = (V,∆, obs, act, v0, S) be a game with opacity condition
over Σ and Γ. A strategy automaton for Gerald is an I/O automaton B =
(M,V ×Σ, V,m0,⇒) where M is a set of memory states, V ×Σ and V are the
input alphabet and output alphabet respectively, m0 is the initial state, and
⇒⊆ M × (V × Σ) × V ×M is the transition relation that updates the current
memory. If m⇒v,av′ m′, then B being in statem and reading input (v, a), outputs
v′ and moves to state m′.
A play ρ = v0a1v1 . . . is consistent with B if there is a sequence of memory
states m1m2 . . . such that mi ⇒vi,ai+1vi+1 mi+1 for i = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
A strategy β has finite memory of size k if it is realized by a strategy au-
tomaton B with |M | = k, in the following sense: for every play ρ = v0a1v1 . . .
induced by β, ρ is consistent with B. In that case, for all i, mi ⇒vi,ai+1β(ρiai+1) mi+1.
Theorem 18 Deciding whether a given finite-memory strategy β is winning for
Gerald is PSPACE-complete in the size of the game and the size of the memory.
Proof We first give an algorithm that takes as input a game A and a strategy
automaton realyzing strategy β, runs in NPSPACE, hence PSPACE [17], and
accepts if β is not winning in A. This algorithm simply nondeterministically
chooses actions for Robert while moves for Gerald are obtained by running the
strategy automaton, and at each round the new information set is computed
and it is checked whether it is contained in S or not. Clearly one only needs
to store in memory the current position in the game, the current state of the
strategy automaton and the current information set, hence only O(n) cells are
needed if n is the number of positions in the game. So the problem of deciding
whether a strategy of Gerald is winning in a game is in coPSPACE = PSPACE
in the size of the game and the memory of the strategy.
Now for PSPACE-hardness we provide a straightforward reduction of the
opacity-guarantee problem in blindfold games. Let A be a blindfold game with
opacity condition, as an instance of the opacity-guarantee problem. We con-
struct in linear time a strategy automaton B that realizes a memoryless strategy
β of Gerald, and obtain an instance of the problem of deciding whether a finit-
state strategy is winning. If β is winning then there exists a winning strategy for
Gerald; conversely if there exists one, because of the equivalence of the opacity-
guarantee and the opacity-verify problem for blindfold games, all strategies for
Gerald are winning, hence β is winning. The opacity-guarantee problem being
PSPACE-complete in the blindfold setting we obtain the PSPACE-hardness.
7 Discussion on complexity
Solving safety games with perfect-information is in PTIME, and solving parity
games with perfect information is known to be in NP ∩ co-NP [11]. However
we have seen that deciding whether Gerald, who has perfect-information, has a
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winning strategy in a game with opacity condition, is EXPTIME-complete, even
if we let Robert play with perfect-information (in the sense that his strategies
are based on actual prefixes of plays instead of their observation). So the gap
between deciding the existence of a winning strategy for a player in perfect-
information games and for Gerald in a game with opacity condition does not
come from the fact that Robert has imperfect information, but rather from
the nature of the winning condition itself, which is based on the notion of
information set, and forces Gerald to keep track of what Robert’s information
set along the game is.
Similarly, verifying that a finite-state strategy is winning in a safety perfect-
information game can be done in PTIME, whereas Theorem 18 shows that in
games with opacity condition, deciding whether a finite-state (and even mem-
oryless) strategy of Gerald is winning is PSPACE-complete in the size of the
arena and the memory of the strategy. The idea is that one has to check that
the strategy is winning not in all positions, but in all information sets. Con-
cerning the size of the memory needed for Gerald’s strategies, we know that an
exponential memory is sufficient because if there is a winning strategy there is a
memoryless one in the powerset construction. The lower bound for the needed
memory is still an open problem.
Finally, note that Theorem 2 gives an EXPTIME lower bound for the model
checking of AETL with perfect recall as defined in [6], since solving the opacity-
violate problem is equivalent to deciding whether the formula 〈〈Robert〉〉FKRobertS
holds in the game arena, where F is the eventuality operator of AETL.
8 Conclusion and perspectives
Following [13], we have extended the study of games with opacity condition.
The opacity condition is an atypical winning condition in imperfect information
arenas aiming at capturing security aspects of computer systems. Since games
with opacity condition are not determined in general, two dual problems need
being considered: the opacity-violate problem and the opacity-guarantee prob-
lem, focusing on the player who has imperfect information and on the player who
has perfect information respectively. The latter problem is usually equivalent
to solving the underlying perfect information game, which explains why it has
never been considered; but the fact that our winning condition is based on infor-
mation sets makes the problem relevant. For both problems, simple power-set
constructions apply to convert such games into perfect information ones, that
can be solved in polynomial time, hence their upper bound is EXPTIME. On
the contrary, the matching EXPTIME lower bound for the opacity-guarantee
problem, where the main player has perfect information, was unknown until
now and relies on an elegant reduction from the empty input string acceptance
problem for linearly-bounded alternating Turing machines. The key point is to
encode configurations by information sets. The reduction and its correctness
proof are very technical, but we could provide an intuitive informal description.
Finally, we focused on the particular case of blindfold games which offers
specific results such as determinacy (Theorem 9) and PSPACE-complete com-
plexities (Theorem 10). The main tool to obtain these results is the opacity-
verify problem which addresses the question whether any strategy of Gerald is
winning. The fact that blindfold games with opacity condition can be seen as
INRIA
Opacity Issues in Games with Imperfect Information 23
one-player games makes this problem relevant and explains why it is equivalent
to the opacity-guarantee problem and to the complement of the opacity-violate
problem in the blindfold setting, as we established. We also proved that it is
PSPACE-complete, by providing a PSPACE algorithm and a reduction from
the nondeterministic finite automata universality problem. The opacity-verify
problem is all the more interesting to consider that it naturally demonstrates
how the paradigm of opacity condition embraces opacity issues investigated in
the recent literature of Control Theory [16, 8].
Games with opacity condition open a novel field in the theoretical aspects
of games with imperfect information by putting the emphasis on the player
who has perfect information. From this point of view, plethora of questions
need being addressed, among which their connection with language-theoretic
issues (the synchronizing/directing word problem [2, 14, 3], controller synthesis
to enforce the opacity of a language [8]), their logical foundations, and their
algorithmic aspects.
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